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Abstract
Conditional information can be equally asserted in the forms if p, then q (e.g., "if I am Ill, I will miss work tomorrow") and q, if p (e.g., "I will miss work tomorrow, if I am ill").
While this type of clause order manipulation has previously been found to have no influence on the ultimate conclusions participants draw from conditional rules, we used self-paced reading to examine how it affects the real time incremental processing of everyday conditional statements. Experiment 1 revealed that clause order interacts with presuppositional congruency as readers hypothetically represent counterfactual statements. When if p, then q counterfactuals contained a presupposition that was incongruent with prior context, these statements took longer to read than when the presupposition was congruent, but for q, if p conditionals there was no such congruency effect. Experiment 2 revealed that reading times were influenced by the subjective probability of an indicative conditional regardless of clause order, with a penalty observed for low probability statements relative to high probability statements in both conditional clause orders. These data reveal a dissociation whereby clause order mediates the effect of suppositional congruency on reading times, but does not mediate the effect of subjective probability.
Conditionals of the form if p, then q allow us to hypothetically consider what could be
(e.g., "if student tuition fees rise, then the number of students from disadvantaged backgrounds will fall") or what could have been (e.g., "if we had not gone to war, there would now be a greater threat from terrorism"). Data from offline reasoning tasks have fuelled a great deal of theoretical debate concerning how we mentally represent and reason with the hypothetical possibilities stemming from if… (See Evans & Over, 2004 for a review). However, while these offline paper and pencil tasks reveal the conclusions that people ultimately draw from conditional information, relatively little is known about the incremental online processes that are used to mentally represent a conditional in real time (see Ferguson & Sanford, 2008; Stewart, Haigh & Kidd, 2009 for recent exceptions).
One potentially important variable that may influence real time processing is the order in which the antecedent and consequent clauses are asserted. For example, a conditional in the canonical clause order if p, then q (e.g., "If I am ill, I will miss work tomorrow") can equally be asserted in the non-canonical forms q, if p (e.g., "I will miss work tomorrow, if I am ill") or q, only if p (e.g., "I will miss work tomorrow, only if I am ill"). These three conditional rules are logically equivalent, given that they are only false when the antecedent is true and the consequent is false. However, q, only if p conditionals have a fundamentally lower P(q | not-p) than both if p, then q and q, if p (Oaksford & Chater, 2007) and induce a different pattern of performance on reasoning tasks (Ormerod, Manktelow, & Jones, 1993) . Therefore, since the experiments below aim to examine of the influence of clause order per se, we focus solely on canonical conditionals of the form if p, then q and non-canonical conditionals of the form q, if p as only these forms are logically, lexically and probabilistically equivalent.
While the psychological equivalence of canonical (if p, then q) and non-canonical (q, if p) conditionals has been indicated by offline reasoning tasks (Evans, Clibbens, & Rood, 1995; Ormerod et al., 1993) it is unclear how clause order interacts with other important variables such as subjective probability and congruency as we incrementally represent and evaluate conditionals in real time. There is good reason to suspect that clause order may have an effect on incremental processing, given that non-canonical conditionals tend to present information in a way that violates the temporal order of events (unlike canonical conditionals). This violation requires the likelihood of the consequent event q (e.g., missing work) to first be evaluated in its own right, before being held in working memory and then re-evaluated within the bounds of the if clause. While there is no evidence that clause order has any direct effect on processing, there is some evidence that it can indirectly influence processing speed by interacting with temporal order. Evans and Newstead (1977) found that participants take longer to comprehend and verify conditional rules when clause order mismatches temporal order. This interaction suggests that clause order is potentially an important moderator that could also interact with other variables as a conditional is incrementally processed.
To date, theories of conditional reasoning are grounded predominately in data from offline reasoning tasks and therefore do not provide explicit accounts of how we incrementally process conditionals. Nevertheless, they do imply some predictions concerning clause order. For instance, the prominent mental models account of conditionals proposed by Johnson-Laird and Byrne (2002) states the initial representation of a conditional begins with a mental model that explicitly represents the True-True (TT) truth table conjunction, p & q. While this conjunction accurately captures the described scenario, it necessarily throws away any information concerning clause order at the earliest possible opportunity. This is because the logical operator '&' does not (and cannot) indicate the order of the clauses, only that they co-occur in a commutative manner. Therefore, from this perspective clause order should not influence how we subsequently process or reason with conditional information.
One theory that more readily accounts for processing level variables is the Suppositional Theory proposed by Evans and Over (2004) . The Suppositional Theory is the psychological implementation of a proposal in philosophical logic that has become known as the Ramsey Test. Ramsey proposed that people judge their belief in conditionals by "…adding p hypothetically to their stock of knowledge and arguing on that basis about q…[fixing] their degrees of belief in q given p…" (Ramsey, 1931; 1990, p. 247) .
The Ramsey Test is essentially a two stage processing account. First, the addressee must temporarily suppose the antecedent proposition as true. Second, the conditional is evaluated by considering the subjective conditional probability of the consequent event (q) occurring within the bounds of this hypothetical world. Like the mental models account this theory also initially represents the TT possibility, but importantly it does not discard the original conditional form (i.e., the clause order).
Although not explicitly formulated as a processing account, the step by step mechanism outlined in the Ramsey Test clearly identifies two separable and sequential stages of processing, with supposition preceding evaluation.
While there is much evidence to support the psychological reality of the Ramsey Test (e.g., Over, Hadjichristidis, Evans, Handley & Sloman, 2007) , this mechanism as originally described by Ramsey is specific to conditionals of the form if p, then q. First the antecedent proposition (p) is supposed, and then only after this has occurred can the probability of the consequent (q) be evaluated. However, when the clauses are not presented in this sequential order (as with non-canonical conditionals) additional or even different cognitive processes may emerge. For this reason the two self-paced reading experiments below examined how clause order mediates both supposition (Experiment 1) and evaluation (Experiment 2) as a conditional is processed.
Experiment 1
Does clause order mediate the influence of congruency on reading times to counterfactual conditionals?
The first stage of processing according to the Suppositional Theory is to hypothetically suppose the antecedent event as though it were true. Experimental evidence using selfpaced reading has shown that the supposition of counterfactual conditionals (which presuppose the negation of their antecedent) is bounded by our world knowledge (Stewart, Haigh & Kidd, 2009 with the congruent hypothetical context set up by the first clause. This is because a unique feature of counterfactuals is that they provide syntactic triggers for hypothetical thinking in the both the antecedent (i.e., if) and consequent (i.e., would) clauses, signalled by the conditional perfect tense. For canonical conditionals (where the presupposition is presented in the first clause) it is known that a reading time penalty occurs when this presupposition is globally incongruent with prior context (Stewart et al., 2009 ). For non-canonical conditionals the presupposition is presented in the second clause. In this case if the presupposition is also evaluated in terms of its global congruence with prior context, regardless of clause order, we would expect identical congruency effects for both conditional forms (i.e., a main effect of Congruency).
However, an alternative possibility is that when the incongruent presupposition is presented in the second clause it is actually evaluated in terms of its local coherence with the first clause. In other words, when the first clause successfully initiates hypothetical thinking (using the conditional perfect tense) the presupposition is evaluated within this hypothetical world rather than in terms of its global coherence. In this case, we would expect an interaction between Clause Order and Congruency, with a congruency effect for canonical conditionals (where the presupposition is presented in the first clause) but not for non-canonical conditionals (where the presupposition is presented in the second clause).
Participants
Thirty-six native English speakers from the University of Manchester population took part. They were each paid £5.
Materials
Twenty-four vignettes were constructed (see Example above and Appendix 1). There were four versions of each vignette and each was four sentences long. Sentence one introduced the protagonist and described some attribute associated with them. This sentence was manipulated in order for the subsequent conditional sentence to be either congruent or incongruent. Sentence two provided additional contextual information.
Sentence three was the counterfactual conditional and thus the target sentence. Sentence four provided additional contextual information. Four Latin-square lists were created with each list also containing sixteen fillers.
Procedure
Each participant was presented with the passages in a different random order. They were informed that they would be presented with 40 passages on a word-by-word basis. In order to advance through the passages, they pressed the 'Next Word' button on a button box. This brought up the next word in the passage and blanked-out the previous one so only one word at a time was visible. Dashes represented the rest of each passage.
Comprehension questions appeared on 25% of the trials. Participants first completed two practice trials.
Results
Individual word reading times were summed to form one critical analysis region that included the conditional statement (i.e., sentence 3) plus the first word of the following sentence to capture any spill over effects (Ehrlich & Rayner, 1983) . when the presupposition is presented in the second clause its local coherence with the first clause (which had previously set up a hypothetical world using 'would') overrides any influence of global coherence.
Experiment 2
Does clause order mediate the influence of subjective probability on reading times to conditional statements?
The aim of Experiment 2 is to determine whether the influence of a conditional's truth (probability) on reading times is moderated by clause order. While the abstract truth functional conditional of philosophical logic can be deemed true or false based on the truth values of its antecedent and consequent clauses, conditionals describing uncertain everyday events cannot be accurately verified in this way (Evans & Over, 2004) .
Therefore the truth of a conditional is commonly quantified as the extent to which it is subjectively perceived as probable (e.g., Over et al., 2007) . This probability is formally expressed as P(if p, then q).
It has previously been shown that readers are sensitive to the probability of canonical indicative conditionals, with subjectively high P(if p, then q) conditionals read faster than subjectively low P(if p then q) conditionals (Stewart, Haigh & Connell, 2010) .
A question that remains unanswered is whether subjective probability influences reading times in the same way for both canonical and non-canonical conditionals. In Experiment 2 we manipulated both P(if p, then q) and clause order then measured reading times to determine whether the previously demonstrated slow down for low (relative to high) P(if p, then q) canonical conditionals also occurs for non-canonical conditionals.
The first possibility is that the evaluation of a conditional is robust to variation in clause order, with canonical and non-canonical conditionals evaluated in the same way for both conditional forms. In this case we would predict only a main effect of Probability, with a slow down for low relative to high P(if p, then q) conditionals regardless of clause order.
However, there is reason to suspect that canonical and non-canonical indicative conditionals are not evaluated in the same way. For canonical clause order conditionals the Suppositional Theory proposes that people engage in a two stage process where they first hypothetically suppose the antecedent and then evaluate the probability of the consequent within this hypothetical world. In contrast, non-canonical indicative conditionals ostensibly cause additional cognitive load as the consequent clause must be evaluated as a bald statement of fact 1 , held in working memory until the 'if' clause is processed, and then re-evaluated within this hypothetical world. These additional stages of processing suggest that non-canonical conditionals may impose a greater cognitive load. If this additional load is reflected in reading times (cf. Just, Carpenter & Woolley, 1982) , then we would expect to find two main effects. One effect would relate to Probability (as above) and the second would relate to Clause Order (with canonical statements read faster than non-canonical statements).
An alternative possibility is that reversing the clause order disrupts the Ramsey Test, given that the clauses are incrementally encountered by readers in the opposite order to that originally described by Ramsey. If the Ramsey Test fails to operate online for non-canonical conditionals, then readers should not be sensitive to the difference between high and low probability statements in this condition. Therefore, we would predict an asymmetrical interaction between Probability and Clause Order (similar to Experiment 1) with an effect of Probability on reading times for canonical conditionals but not for non-canonical conditionals.
Experiment 2 used self-paced reading to examine how reading times are influenced by both P(if p then q) and clause order. This was achieved by manipulating the subjective probability of indicative conditionals to be either high or low and clause order in a 2x2 repeated measures design. The dependent variable was reading time to the conditional statement.
Participants
Twenty-four native English speakers from the University of Manchester population took part. None of these took part in Experiment 1. They were each paid £5.
Materials
Thirty-two vignettes were constructed (see Example and Appendix 2). There were four versions of each vignette and each was four sentences long. Sentences one, two, and four provided contextual information. Sentence three contained the indicative conditional. We created four Latin-square lists, each list also contained sixteen fillers.
Example Vignette from Experiment 2
Participants read conditionals that were either high or low probability presented in either the canonical (1) or non-canonical (2) clause order.
The National Union of Students often highlights the link between student tuition fees and applications for university places. A number of reports into the link were recently completed. The Union argues that… 1. …if student tuition fees fall, applications for university places will rise/fall.
2. …applications for university places will rise/fall, if student tuition fees fall.
…At present university tuition fees can cost up to £3000 per year.
Procedure
The procedure was identical to Experiment 1.
Results
Individual word reading times were summed to form one critical analysis region identical to Experiment 1.
Example analysis region
…if student tuition fees fall, applications for university places will rise. At…
Analysis was performed using 2 x 2 (Probability x Clause Order) ANOVAs with subjects For canonical conditionals high probability statements (5828 msec.) were read faster than low probability statements (6312 msec.) (t1(23) = 2.97, p = 0.007; t2 (31) = 2.15, p = 0.039). This effect was also found for non-canonical conditionals, with high probability statements (5782 msec.) again read faster than low probability statements (6332 msec.) (t1(23) = 2.97, p = 0.007; t2 (31) = 2.50, p = 0.018).
There was no main effect of Clause Order (both Fs <1) and no interaction between Probability and Clause Order (both Fs <1) (See Figure 2 ). ***FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE***
Discussion
Our data reveal that reading times to indicative conditionals are influenced by Probability (with high probability conditionals read faster than low probability conditionals), but not by Clause Order. The reading time penalty corresponding to low P(if p, then q) was apparent for both canonical and non-canonical forms. This suggests that the influence of probability on reading time to a conditional statement is independent of clause order.
General Discussion
Two experiments show that clause order mediates the effect of suppositional congruency (Experiment 1) but not subjective probability (Experiment 2) on reading times to conditional statements. In Experiment 1 clause order interacted with presuppositional congruency to influence reading times. Specifically, a congruency effect was found on reading times to canonical but not to non-canonical counterfactuals. This shows that the antecedent presupposition is constrained by global coherence for canonical counterfactuals but by local coherence for non-canonical counterfactuals. In other words, hypothetical thinking is bounded by prior context for canonical counterfactuals, but at least temporarily unbounded for non-canonical counterfactuals. Experiment 2 then showed that reading times to indicative conditionals are affected by subjective probability but not by clause order, with readers equally sensitive to low P(if p then q) in both conditional forms. This suggests that the online probabilistic evaluation of a conditional is robust to variation in clause order. These two experiments indicate conditional processing can be divided into at least two distinct stages (supposition and evaluation) that interact differentially with clause order.
In terms of suppositional processing Experiment 1 shows that so long as the first clause successfully initiates hypothetical thinking using the conditional perfect tense (i.e., if or would) the second clause will be evaluated within this frame of reference (and not in terms of prior context). It has been argued that 'if' has a special capacity to trigger hypothetical thought. Our data suggest that this capacity applies to the conditional perfect tense in general, with 'would' also successfully triggering hypothetical thinking. What is important is that a hypothetical world is successfully set up in the first clause and this can be achieved using both 'if' and 'would'. When the first clause is incongruent with prior context, hypothetical thinking is not easily initiated (evidenced by a slow down in reading times). However, once this hypothetical world is set up the evaluation of the second clause appears to be isolated from prior context. Stalnaker (1968) proposed a version of the Ramsey Test in which people temporarily update their beliefs, making the minimal possible change to their world knowledge so that the antecedent proposition is true within this hypothetical world. This is consistent with our findings for canonical counterfactuals. When the presupposition was incongruent (thus requiring a large minimal change) the conditional took longer to read that when it was congruent (which required a much smaller minimal change, if any).
For non-canonical counterfactuals however, we found no congruency effects. This is more consistent with the unbounded approach to suppositional thinking described by Cosmides and Tooby (2000) . They propose that suppositional thinking is temporarily decoupled from prior context, occurring in isolation from other propositions. They state:
"Supposition involves the introduction of propositions of unevaluated or suspended truth value, which are treated as true within a bound scope…The operator "if", for example, opens up a suppositional world…whose contents are kept isolated from other
proposition-sets, so that true propositions are not intermixed and hence confused with false ones…or potentially false ones…" (Cosmides & Tooby, 2000 p. 65) Our data support a mechanism whereby a minimal change mechanism is employed to evaluate the first clause of a conditional, consistent with Stalnaker; but once the first clause successfully triggers hypothetical thinking, the second clause is temporarily decoupled and evaluated within the bounds of this supposition consistent with definition of supposition put forward by Cosmides and Tooby (2000) . In other words, information presented in the first clause appears to be bounded by prior discourse context and requires a minimal change, but once the first clause successfully triggers hypothetical thinking, information in the second clause is isolated from other propositions and evaluated only within this hypothetical world.
In terms of the evaluation of a conditional, clause order has no effect on reading times (Experiment 2). Participants read high probability statements faster than low probability statements regardless of clause order. This shows that clause order does not mediate the probabilistic evaluation of a conditional. Furthermore, our experiments did not detect any indication that clause order increases processing load in its own right, although this is not to say that experiments with greater experimental power will also fail to find such an effect. What our data do suggest is that proposed evaluative mechanisms such as the Ramsey Test appear to operate successfully regardless of clause order.
Whether the same strategy is used for both canonical and non-canonical conditionals is a question for future research. The Ramsey Test is a good candidate, but must ultimately be modified to explain how it deals with both conditional forms.
The experiments above show the importance of processing level variables to the mental representation of conditionals. Until recently, reasoning research has tended to overlook real time processes. This is due to largely to the traditional reliance on the Deduction Paradigm, which has proven successful in revealing the ultimate conclusions participants draw from conditional premises. However, to gain a full understanding of how we reach these conclusions it is necessary to identify and tease apart the real time processes that enable us to represent and evaluate conditionals. 3 Naomi was a lively 6 year old and had learned to walk at a young age/ Naomi had not yet learned to walk as she was just 6 months old. She was always full of energy. If she had been old enough to walk, she could have taken herself to the local playground/ She could have taken herself to the local playground, if she had been old enough to walk.
Every afternoon it was full of the children from the local neighbourhood.
4 Jane loved being a vegetarian and enjoyed eating tasty tofu burgers/ Jane loved eating sausage and bacon sandwiches. She spent a lot of time eating out at restaurants. If she had been a vegetarian, she would probably have enjoyed eating the lentil bake at the local vegan café/ She would probably have enjoyed eating the lentil bake at the local vegan cafe, if she had been a vegetarian. The café regularly won awards in the national vegan food and drink competition. 14 Tom had developed sensitive hearing after damaging his eyesight in a childhood accident/ Tom had lost his hearing in a childhood accident. When a child, he had accidentally swallowed some powerful chemicals. If he had had good hearing, he would probably have been more confident as a teenager/ He would probably have been more confident as a teenager, if he had had good hearing. He often felt socially isolated.
15 Poppy was an enthusiastic animal rights supporter/ Poppy loved going fox hunting.
She really enjoyed the rural life. If she had been an animal rights supporter, she would probably have protested against the hunts in her local village/ She would probably have protested against the hunts in her local village, if she had been an animal rights supporter.
Many of her friends were involved in anti-hunt protests. 24 Mary was a student who had taken out a student loan/ Mary was a student who had never needed a student loan. She graduated with a first class degree. If she had taken out a student loan, she would probably have been able to go on holiday after graduation/ She would probably have been able to go on holiday after graduation, if she had taken out a student loan. Instead, she had to start earning money almost immediately.
Appendix 2: Experimental materials used in Experiment 2
Each item shows the high and low P(if p then q) conditions in the canonical order. For the non-canonical condition the order of the clauses was simply reversed.
01 Living with the threat of terrorism and negotiating numerous security checks have become familiar burdens for those travelling by air. Security officials from Britain's largest airports today met to discuss future directions for airport security. They reason that if the threat of terrorism rises, airport security checks will increase/decrease.
Officials will continue to monitor the situation on a daily basis.
02 Town planning officials from Greater Manchester are undertaking a survey to determine how many new houses will be needed to account for predicted changes in population over the next ten years. This will form the basis of their new housing strategy.
Inevitably, if the population of Manchester increases, the number of new houses built annually in Manchester will rise/fall. The city currently has a population of 452,000. 12 Conflicts in the Middle East have destabilised the price of oil subsequently affecting petrol prices in the UK. This has caused a great deal of uncertainty for consumers.
Analysts predict that if the cost of oil increases, the cost of petrol will rise/fall.
Consumers need to be aware of these potential changes.
13 The boom in online retail has commonly been linked to identity theft. Thieves often use these identities to launder money. Many experts ague that if the popularity of online shopping increases, the risk of identity theft will rise/fall. Each day thousands of pounds are spent online.
14 Cancer Research UK have recently released a report summarising the extent of their research into life threatening cancers. Despite many breakthroughs much more research is needed. In appealing for donations they remind us that if the amount of money spent annually on cancer research rises, the amount of research into cancer treatment will increase/decrease. Donations can be made through the Cancer Research UK website.
15 AIDS charities constantly appeal for donations to fund research into treatments. While our knowledge is constantly improving much more research is needed. These charities are keen to emphasise the message that if the amount of money spent annually on AIDS research rises, the amount of research into AIDS treatment will increase/decrease. This could affect many millions of lives.
16 The current popularity of organic food is reflected by its presence on our supermarket shelves. The Soil Association aim to promote organic food and encourage a healthier lifestyle. They believe that if the amount of organic food sold in shops rises, the popularity of organic food will increase/decrease. Only by expanding the range will sales increase.
17 A leaked report commissioned by the Department for Transport has suggested a link between motorway congestion and petrol prices. So far the Department of Transport have refused to comment. The leaked report predicts that if the cost of petrol falls, motorway congestion at peak times will worsen / improve. At present journey times can be doubled at peak times.
18 The National Union of Students often highlight the link between student tuition fees and applications for university places. A number of reports into the link were recently completed. The Union argues that if student tuition fees fall, applications for university places will rise/fall. At present university tuition fees can cost up to £3000 per year. 21 Greenpeace are working on a new campaign to make people more energy efficient.
They want people to realise the benefits of saving energy. Greenpeace argue that if the use of energy efficient technology in the home increases, utility bills will fall/rise. The campaign is set to be launched later this year. 23 The Environment minister has unveiled plans to produce a strategy which will reduce inner city pollution. The strategy will be based on a five year study of pollution levels.
The study suggests that if the government decreases its spending on the environment, inner city pollution will increase / decrease. Inner city pollution is caused primarily by carbon dioxide emitted from car engines.
24 The Treasury receives millions of pounds each year from cigarette taxes. However, attitudes to smoking may change in the future. The Treasury must therefore account for the possibility that if the number of people who take up smoking each year increases, government revenue from cigarette taxes will rise/fall. Money from cigarette taxes is often spent on public services such as the NHS.
25 The British Heart Foundation continually campaigns to generate funds for research into heart disease. This research could potentially save many thousands of lives. They believe strongly that if the amount of money spent annually on preventing heart disease decreases, levels of heart disease will rise/fall. Donations can be made to the British Heart Foundation through their website.
26 Because of a recent shortage of oil, electricity companies are trying to reduce the amount of electricity that consumers use. They think that changing their pricing tariffs is the best way to achieve this. They reason that if the cost of electricity falls, electricity consumption will increase/decrease. Electricity bills are a substantial outlay for most households across the country.
27 Proposals to change the current British driving test have been welcomed by insurers.
Young drivers are often hardest hit by insurance prices. Insurers predict that if driving tests are made easier, car insurance prices for young drivers will rise/fall. Driving standards in Britain are currently among the best in Europe. 
